Now about the certificates – most laypeople, myself included, won’t know what to do with them, in all honesty. To me at least, they don’t offer same peace of mind as PGP verification. This is because I have total control over the process and origin of PGP public key (after I downloaded it, of course). I know that the key I have in my keyring is the one I imported years ago. I know where I got it and where I am checking it , I have no such control over certificates, it’s something that’s appeared on my machine and tells me it’s OK but I had no involvement in the process.

You make some good points. Fortunately it isn’t quite this easy to replace a file without us noticing, and your assessment of our current security measures isn’t completely accurate. Every one of our installers is digitally signed with a third party sig. If any changes are made to to the installer or its contents, that signature becomes invalid. So if you right click on one of our installers and select Properties, you’ll see a tab for digital signatures. If there has been any tampering with the files there will be a red X here and the statement that the signature is invalid.

This is a way that you can check a file yourself for validity.

In addition, we check every file to verify signatures. This is one of our own, in-house security measures. So, while your scenario isn’t impossible, it is highly improbable that any attempt like this would go unnoticed. (Not to mention that they’d have to first bypass boot and login passwords on multiple systems to even pull this off in the first place….a crowbar might get you into our building, but it won’t get you into our systems.)

Fortunately, in the past 10+ years we’ve never had a problem, but part of what makes us the best in the market is that we are always working to improve our products. We are already looking at methods of notifying the user if a file is invalid during the installation process, something you will likely see in the next release of eWallet.

Sincerely,
Marc Tassin
Senior Product Manager

Well, I have a bone to pick with you, then

The worst case scenario, in my view, would be someone _quietly_ breaking into your office and posting a malicious “upgrade” copy of eWallet posing as you. Then collect all valuable personal data users put in their eWallets, and smile all the way to the offshore bank.

Well… nevermind… they really don’t have to break in to do that. They can just set up a phishing site. Because, if I am correct, there’s still no way to verify that download actually came from ilium.

This is the main reason that years ago I dumped eWallet in favor of a similar freeware application whose author provided PGP signature verification on all downloads.

You’re not alone, though – all commercial wallet type application developers missed this very important safety step, last I checked.

As for the banks – I’m glad that the information on the customer-facing side is well-protected, but it seems that every time I hear of a security breach it’s because of flawed internal practices. I’m glad to hear that this is not an issue with the machine that was taken from your office, but it seems that you’re in a minority right now.

In regards to mobile security, I know that Windows Mobile owners have several options now for installing something very similar to a lo-jack system on their devices. Some can send text messages to a predefined target or call home regularly. Some even allow receipt of text messages to harass the person. One piece of software even sends something if the SIM card is changed out. I also remember reading a story of someone whose phone was stolen, but the thief took pictures and denied stealing it. I think she eventually got the phone back after a long drawn out battle, but the thieves had no shame at all in being found out.

I hope everything transitions smoothly for you all after the break-in. It’s never a fun experience to come in and find something missing that you expect to see.